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s Subsequent courts have extended &hatholding

of Worker-Management Relations Panel on Private

N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1996, at 5 (noting a dramatic
ee the Gilmer decision in 2991); Margaret A. Jacobs,
keptical of Arbrtration, W& ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at

s,

592

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW fiEVEEW I1997

contracts with existing employees and prospective hires.'
Employers have mbraced these agreements, haping that
arbitration will deliver what it promises: inexpensive and speedy
decisionmaking, finality, and confiden~iality.%oreover, many
employers are convinced that together with providing a more
expeditious, less expensive system of justice, arbitration will
improve their bettam line by lowering potential damage awards."
Employers' enthusiasm fox the perceived benefits af inserting
arbitration clauses into employment agreements, together with
the judicial approval of these cia use^,^ ensures the continued use
of such agreements in the nonunionized workplace,*

4. See, e.g., Mrgo v. Shearson b h m a n Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992); Willia v. Dean Witter T(eyno1ds, Inc,, 948 P.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
5. See Note, Mandatary Arbitration of Statutory En~ployrnent Dzsputes, 109
HARV.L REV.1670, 1673 (1986).
6. See
0.Mathimon, Eualuating a d Using Emplyer-initiated Arbitration
Poltctrrv aiid &reentent$: Preparing the Workplace for the Xwetzty-first Century. in
EWI~WNT
DJSCRLMMATION
AND CIVILRLCH'E ACTIONS ZM FEDERAL AND STAI'E
COURTS,
793,795 (ALX-ABA Course of Study, Feb. 22, 1996). available in Westlaw, C A M ALEABA 393 ('{Edmployers faced with the potential of castly employment-relabd
lawsnib
. have been weighing alternative meam of resolving such disputes in place
of trial by jury.']; Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the
. L.Q. 684 C1996);
Suprerr~e Court's Preference for Birding Arbitration, 74 W ~ r r U.
Patricia Sturdevant & Dwight Galnnn, Sbuld Bindug Arbitrat~on Clauses be
Pmhrbited m Cansunwr Contracts?, D m . RicSOi,. MAG.,Summer 1994, at 4-5 (stating
t h t companies use arbitration clauws ta avoid juries, among other thingsi. However,

..

tittle. empirical svidence has been gathered ta support the notion that arbitration
fotvers damage awards.

7. See Gilrner, 500 U.S, 20; Patterson v. 'renet Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832
(8th Cir. 1997);Cole v. Burns Int'l Sw.Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
8. Although employers have used Gilrner as a justification for insertion o f
arbitration agreemen& in contracts d employment, that decision may be premature.
Ono controversial issue Gilmer did not addreus was whether $ 1 d t h e Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) ineludes within ita covernge agresme~rtsto arbitrate statutory
claim betweon wnptayem a n d ertrployees. The FAA was designed to place arbitration
agrcemenb on quad fmting with any other contract. See 9 U.S.C. Q 2 (1994). Yet 5 1
af tlm FAA limits the FAA's coverage, stating that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contraota sf employment af seamen, rdlmad employees, or any other c l a s s sf
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. 5 1. The Gilmer Court did n o t
reach the issue whether 8 1 excludee from it6 coverage contracts of employment
bctween employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce, because the
contract in Qilmr was between Gilmar and the New York S k k Exchange, not Gilnler
and his employer. If 8 1 excludee contracts of enqdoyment fmm its coverage, those
contmcte will be urhenforceaMs unless etate law indicates othenvise. See Ware,supra
note 3, a t 94-95. While Gilrmr did not address the B 1 isaus, many other courts have.
See Cldc, 105 F.3d at 1471 (stating that '(every circuit to consider this issue squarerr
hm found that section I of tkre FAA exempts only the employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goo& in intemhte oommerce"). Because the vast
m.ajarity d courts have held that I 1 of the FAG excludes from its coverage only the!
contracta of employment of workera actually involved in transporting goads, it seems

A certain inevitability surrounded the emergence of
arbitration as a preferred method for resolving employment
disputes in the nonunionized sector. After all, arbitration had
long been the preferred means for resolving employment
disputes i n the unionized workplaceg Perhaps it w a s the
extraordinary szlccess of arbitration in resolving disputes in the
sector t h a t precipitated nonunionized employers'
adoption of arbitration t o resolve their own ever-increasing
numbor of employment disputes. Whatever the reason for its
increased use, arbitration of employment disputes in the
nonunionized sector is here to stay.
Although arbitration originated in organized labor and
csmmercisrl settings, in at least one respect, nonunionized
arbitration has developed more rapidly than arbitration in the
unionized sector." W i l e Gilrner approved the use of predispute
agreements t o arbitrate discrimination claims in the
noxlukonized workplace, the use of such agreements is nat
permitbd in the unionized world because of the 1974 Supreme
Court docision in Alexander u. Gardner-Denver.ll In GardnerDmwuer, the issue was whether an unionized employee, who, as
required by his union's collective bargaining agreement, had
submitted his ciaim under the agreement's nondiscrimination
clause to h a 1 arbitration, retained the right to bring a Title VII
claim in federal court following the arbitration. The Court
determined that an unionized employee's right to a trial de novo
an a Title VEI claim is not precluded by prior submission of a
cIaim to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's
nondiscrimination clause.12
The continued viability of Gardner-Denver follawing Gilmer
remains an open question, at least in cases where the parties
expressly agree to abide by antidiscrimination laws. Gilmer
superficially addressed Gardner-Denver's continuing validity in
response t o CriImer's argument t h a t statutory claims could not be
unlikely that the Supreme Court rvould reverse direction and exclude such contracts
from the FAA's coverage.
9. See Thomas J. Pjskarski and David 8. floss, Private Arbifrution as fhe
Bdwive Means of Resolving Emplgyrnent-RelatedDisputes, 19 EMPLOYEEREL. L.J. 205,
209 {1993).

nemliy Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace:
Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37 B.C.

court and several

13. See GiBmer v. InbnstaWJohnsorz Lane Corp., 800 U.S. 20 (1991).
14. See id. at 33.
15, See Mart;in A. Mralin, RrbEtmtcng Stat~tury Eraployment C l a ~ n sin the
Af&L.rrr&ath
of Gitrner, 40 ST, UUIS
U.L.J.77, 84 (1996).
16, See Austin v. Owens-Brwkway Glass Container Inc., 78 P.3d 875 (4th Cir.)
(enforcing irxeecutury arbika~onagreement In collective bargaining context), cert.
denied, 151 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Bright 7 . Narsbipco & Norfblk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Carp., 951 F, Sup, 95 (E.D.Va. 1997); Brummetk v. Gopaz Packing Corp., 954 F.
Supp. 180 {S.D.
Ohio 1996); .Jessie v, Csl-ter Health Care Center, Inc., 930 F. Supp.

1174, 1176-74 IE.B. Ky. 1991961 (foliewing Austin).
17. 38 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.).
18. Sea td. at 882,
19. Fd. at 880-82.
20. See Kevin P. McGowm, Labor t a w : Size of Award Still Largely Determined
by Stade Law, Say AN"urne9on A84 Panel, I19961 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at
I)-16 (Aug. 13, 19%); Richard C. huben, Mandcstopy Arbitration Ckauses Under Fire,
82 A.R.A. J. 58 (1996).

s Is inconsistent wit& the

ility of arbitration
er judicial decisions.21
rdner-Denver, while
Denver's facts, is no
es have agreed to

&Gon of employment, to sign a predispute arbitration
er;~nesttforegoing all access to jury trials, is enforceable, then
the "Ga~drter-Denverapeement," an agreement between the
union and employer to arbitrate employees' claims, must be
enforceable, This article uses a game theoretic analysis
that there is actually greater reason to enforce
"Calrdner-Denver aseements" than "Gilmer agreements." Game
theoq demonstrates that the structural protections inherent in
t h co:allective bargaining ca text cannot be duplicated in cases
inva;lving agreements to a itrate individual statutory claims.
Thus, this article contends that even if Gilmer is ultimately
owcrtunn~d,2~"Gardner-Denver agreements" should remain
eaforcearble.

mer, the Court compelled arbitration of Gilmer's age
n claim because he had signed a predispute

lmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 US. 20 (1991);
r Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.477 (1989); Rodriguez de Quijas
ss 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
itration Agreements between Employers and Employees,
(arguing that Gflmer should be overturned).

Gikmer has prompted commentato
he aftermath of

23, Cilrner also argued, among other things, that arbitral procedures were
Enwufficient to protect his rights, Gilmer cldmed that the arbitrators were biased i n
favor o f the employer, and that the llrnitod discovery available was insufXicient a s was
the tack of written opinions. See G i l r e r , 500 U.S. at 30-31
24, 346 U S , 427 (19531,reu'd, Rodr~guez,490 US,at. 481. In Wilko,the Court
hold that rt predispute agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under 5 12(2) of the
Stqu~tieeAct was unenformable bcause a judicial forum was necessary to protect t h e
substantive rights created by the Securitiee Act on behalf of investors. The Wilko
court's decision rested prim&Iy on its belief that arbitration was inadequate to enforce
statutory rights. Thus, where the arbitral forum provides insufficient protection t o
stututary rights, W h o commands that the statute'e beneficiaries be permitted to m e s s
a judicial forum. Since the 198Os, however, the Court has never found the arrbitral
forum an inadequate venue for vindication of statutory rights.
26. See Ciilmer, 500 US. a t 33. It is mrprising that the Court did not use Gilmer
to reconsider Gardner-Denver. It seems counterlntuitive that Galtner should endorse,
enforcement of arbitration apwments between parties with disparate negotiating
incentlvesd~nployertland employees-while it continues, following Gardner-Denver,
to reject wholesale the agreements reached by parties with similar negotiating
incentives-unions and empioyers. Without &&fieant consideration, the Gitmer Court,
and the majority of esutfg ~ddressingthis question since OElmer, rest the decision n o t
to enforce the ccailective preference of a unionized workforce on Gardner-Denver's
holding that statutory employment claims are independent from a collective bargaining
iigr-reement's arbitration -procedure. This issue will be considered in "
meater d e o t h i n
P& HI af this article,
26. See Btisentine v. Stone & Webshr En& Corp., 117 P.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997);
Hurrlsun v. Eddy Potash, Xnc., 112 F.3d 1437 (Nth Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F A 354, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Michele Hoyman and Lamont E.
Shlkwod, Tke Arbitration of Di8crimiwtion Grievances in the Aftermath of GardnerDenver, 39 &D. J, 49 (1984) (calling for Gardner-Denver's reversal long before Gilrner
was decided); Malin, supra note 15.
27. See, s,g,, Brisentinu, 117 F.3d at 522-23; fliarrisor~,112 F.Sd a t 1437; Pryner,
109 Fa% 354; Thm V. %hn,
54 F.3d 115, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1995); Humphrey v. Council

8
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'

at Gardner-Denver is inconsistent with the
therefore, used Gilmer to
pslindples Gilrner advoeat
rdner-Denver in light of
re+?&~ a r d n e r - D e n v ~ r . ~ ~
r demonstrates that Ialany of the reasons offered in support
rdner-Denver were wrong when progered; other reasons,
such as the unsuitability ~f the arbitral forum to resolve
er correctly state the law. Given the
changed perception of arbitratio
justifications for the Gardner-De
ave a p e d to resolve their
claims using external
antidiscrimination law, Gardn
Gardner-Denver
e issues in reach
n. The Court's first
employee's right to a trial de
be precluded because of his
an a r b i t ~ a t o r Second,
.~~
the
the adequacy of the arbitral
ubstitute for litigation.30 hird, in a footnote, the
the concern t h a t the interests of the individual
might be subordinate to those of the group if the union were
permitted to waive an employee's right to select a forum.31
sted that a n employee's right to be free
Finally, the Court s
from racial discrim
n is an individual statutory right that
the union is not authorized t o waive,32

ses cited supra notes 16-17, 21.
exander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S.36, 52-53 (1974).Unlike Gilrner
a nonunionized employee's contractual agreement with his employer to

ula;
er to the exhnt
it P
oun.
inferior b;s litiga$i~n
for the resolution of statuto;osgrdaims. Accordin

Ulnr our recent arbitration cases we ham alrea
of these a r w m e n t ~as ins
rbitration ""rs[tl
stahtov claims. Such gene
weakening the
on suspidon of arbitrati
protections agorded in the substantive law to would-be
as ouch, they am 'far out o f step with our
ement of the federal statutes fsvvoring this
method of resolving
e prospective litigant
The Court also stated, "so lo
tory cause of action in
effectively may vindicate his or
bitsaf forum, the statute will continue to serve its reme
elrsent function."@*
with Gardner-Denuer's
Yet the decision in GiZnzer
rests between the u n i o n
theory that; a potential disparity
and an employee me
a t subsequent litigation of a s t a t u t o r y
eover, &heGilrner Court reiterated i t s
claim is permissible.
ning arbitration involved contractual,
Court also espoused the Gardnerthe union has tho power Lo waive collective
ividuaal rights.97 Thus, the GiZmer C o u r t
rdner-Denver remains good law because
Gilrner involved an express agreement to arbitrate s t a t u t o r y
.8. 20, 30 (19919 ( q u o t i n g

er-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
t h the existence of a potential
een collective representation a n d
deviate fmm the interests of
, the "tension" is based o n the
its members. Id. Because these
union acting detrimentally t o
cern rather than two.
ent, the grievance a r b i t r a t o r
e union-management d i s p u t e s .
a h noneontractual disputes and
ssiat her in resolving the
eated by the existen@
grievances. I n d i v i d u a l
n representation.

t&ility t o waive the collective
include the ability t o waive
ct a forum for the
rimination claim; (3)

of its constituents does not

etween the Interests of the Union and the
Repmsented Employee is hsignifificant
0th in Gardner-Denver and later in Gilrner,
raised the important concern that the union, as labor's exclusive
representative, might use its power to bargain to the detriment
of the interests of a certain employee or group of employees.3g
The theory is that unions might sacrifice individual or protected
oups' preferences in order to obtain benefits for the majority.

r court also stated that while Gilmer arose under the FAA,
not. While it i s true that courts believe the FAA reflects the

claims,
I. Public choice theory s
am not compromised

sts that protected graup interesls

It i s entirely possible that protected giroups-those whose
rights are protected by antidiscrimination statutes--actually
receive greater attention and representation from the union than
does the majority, Unions may be more responsive to the needs
d classes because they articulate those concerns to
lo the majority remains silent.
This is an application of the theory of public choice.
choice theory involves the application of mieroeconomi
game theory to le@slativede~isionmaking.~~ile public choice
theory has typically focused on the production of law b y
legislators, regulatory agencies and courts, the theory applies
equally well to any large, elected group that must respond to ids
constituency. Public choice theorists explain that the
compromises reached by legislators, as codified in statutes,
depend, in great part, upon the influence of special i n t e r e s t
groups. Theoretically, the groups with greatest influence are

i

P

40. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.332 (1944) (recognizing that the union
is the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit); Bryner, 109 F.3d at 362 PAn agreement negotiated by the union
elected by a majority of workers in the bargaining unit binds all members of t h e unit

. . . .").

41, In a grievance procedure, the union represents the aggrieved employee. See
H. MAtM, IND~VIDUAL
RIGHTSWITHIN THE UN~ON
384 (1988).
42. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MNN. L. REV. 241, 250 (1992).
h&WIN

8

)

situated individual^.'^
d in organizing due to
are more "likely t o
ionate burdens , . .
predicts that "lots"
benefits to small
legislative results

exists, can be obtained by examination of the analogue to the
""legislation" produced by the union-the "collective bargaining
agreement2'-as well as ot er quantifiable union activities, such
as lobbying.
The universal inclusion of nondiscrimination clauses in
collective bargaining apeements would seem to suggest
protected group capture. So too would the continuing union
efforts to eliminate sexual di~crimination,~%ndfetal protection
More ree
, union efforts on behalf of the disabled
culminated in the
ge of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, demonstrating the powerful influence of protected groups.48
43. See id.
44. Id. at 250-51. Title VII was passed to eliminate disproportionate burdens

suffered by minorities and to provide then with discrete benefits.
45. Id. at 251.
46. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986):AFSCME

onal Union v. Jo

i

affirmative action

$

$

Risks of marginalization and erasure of protected classes
unions exist--historically, unions were hardly thought of
protector8 of minority rights. Yet even commentators who
believe that; unions tend to favor majority interests, concede that
er consciousness as
many unions have 'ktteempted to foster
well as class consciousness through
ir organizing and
pressure stratedes," and that "the labor movement has dsnle
more than any other social institution to improve women's
econamic s d a t ~ s . Thus
" ~ ~ unions,
at first blush would s e e m
marc?. likely to marginalize protect
ups, may in fact do m u c h
to advance minority interests.
Agplying public choice theory to the operation of unions, one
would expect to see groups who may suffer disproportionately if
predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are include
in collective bargaining ag-mements organizing and using their
influence to ensure that the union does not concede their right to

i

y

a

-

L.J. 219, 220 (1993).
49. 443 W.S. 193 (1979).

60. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
51. Crain, s u m no& 39, at 2960. But see Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Wailring
and Defemirg ntle WI Claims, 58 BROOK.
L. REV. 779,796 (1992)(stating that while
all employees benefit from unions, unions historically discriminated frequently on the
basia of race).

x

i

;
G

B

9

i c choice theory is
n g is whether the

pledges of money for re

n campaims and public support,

employees themseifves." 3n order t o file a representation
petition, a union must first demonstrate that a substantial
number of employees support the union,5"
that at least thirty percent o f the emplo
bargaining unit support the union, i t will call for an electionY In
Ghat election process, a rival nion can obtain a position on the
ballot upon the showing sf t e support of just a single

group decisionmaking, any single person's actions will have an
on the outcome. As a result, a rational person will try to "fhe-riden
, in the hope of benefitting from other people's actions. See DANIEL
IP FRICKEY,
LAW AND RJBLIC
CHOICE23 (1991).In smaller p u p s ,
ual's actions will
of whether the e

. See Comtel Sys.

101.18 (1996). N

during the judicial review process or, before that, substantially
changed through the Con essional committee system." The
legismtion
so receive a Presidential veto or may b e
delegated
inistrative agency for further
G
tion."' The possibility that proposed legislation will b e
s
ally altered or misinterpreted decreases the incentive
of the interest oup to influence the legislation. Yet public:
choice theory remains a popular method for explaining
fedslatian.

d

j-

J

s

56, See JWS
(19781,
57, See id,

B,A ~ X B O EVC
N AL., LABOR R E ~ ~ I O AM)
N S SOCEAL
PROBLEMS146-47

58. Once n new union is elected, rival unions are barred from challenging t h e
incumbeirt union for at leaat twelve months. See 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c)(3) (1994). If t h e
incunlbent union neptiaba a b:011wI;ive bargaining agreement that lasts three or more
years, rivat uniona are bmed &am challenging the incumbent union for three y e w s .
See LAaoa LAWCASESM D MATEKIAL~279 fArchibaid Cox et al. ede., 1990).
59, See Jonathan in. Macey, Pub& Choice: The Thory of the Firm and the
Thaoly of itlarkst Exchange, 74 CORNELLL.REV. 45, 56 (1988).
60. See id. at 59.

4
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s t in the union setting, the
atly reduced. A
slation" in the
need only concern itself with the
will change the proposed
ight subsequently misinterpret
it, The reviewing court might also commit
possibility is not s i ificant because only li
ie available, While these are real possibilities, the universe of
potential effects in the union settin is smaller than the
possibility of altera
f le&slation in the legislative process.
Thus, the protect
oups' incentives to influence union
"legislation" is a t least as strong as an interest group's incentive
ta hfluence legislation.
porting application of public
een gathered, in at least one
e Board recognized the analogies.
the Board stated that the effect
ght "cause minorities to coalesce,
uld lead to collective action with
oard emphasized
that given their organization
minority groups,
ng alone, should have the strength to eliminate
criminatory practices by the
Applying public choice theory in the union setting, one would
redict that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims would not
e included in collective bargaining agreements if the wellorganized protected groups be1 ed that such agreements were
nod in their best interest.
ause these agreements are
becoming more frequent rather than less, the protected groups
may well believe that such agreements are not disadvantageous.
2. Title Vbl of the Civil ights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination against protected groups

In the absence of empirical evidence supporting the
application of public choice theory to union action, concerns that
the union will prefer majority interests a t the expense of

protected groups
legislative prohctions against union abuse of

groups.

decisions are reasonable, courts consider the basis for the union%
decision. If the union's decision is based on "impermissible" or
"invidious" factors, the union Is held to be in breach of its duty.
"Impermissible factors" include the members' race, sex, national
origin, political positions or status as union members. To t h e
extent that most nondiscrimination clauses in collective
bargaining agreements have been expanded to include other
protected statuses, union decisionmaking that relied upon such
information is likely to be considered a breach as
Courts hold that the fair representation duty imposes on
labor unions both the duty not to discriminate and a n
"affirmative duty t o take corrective steps to ensure compliance
with %tie VlII.'767Thusl the fair representation duty, a t least i n
the context of members' discrimination claims in contract
negotiation and administration, imposes a significant burden o n
the union to avoid even the appearance of discriminatory
decisionmaking.
Some commentabrs criticize judicial analysis o f the fair
representation duty, suggesting that the courts' limited judicial

4

r
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Y
64. See Vaca v. Sips, 386

US. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345

U.S. 330 (1953).
65. See Air Line Pilots b s ' n v+ O'Neili, 499 U.S. 65, 72 (1991); Ryan v. P~nting
Pressman Local Ne. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979);Figuema De Arroyo v. Sindicato
De Trabqjadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
66. See Connye Y.Harper, Origin and Nature of the Duty of Fair Representation,
12 LAB. L.J. 183, 184-85 (1998).
67, Id. at I87 (citing Donne11 v. General Motors Gorp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1978)).

1

t

earaingless because it is

ile judicial review of DFR violations is a potential

vi~lation.~'
Moreover,

p&nciple of distributive fairness should not aflkct the vitality of
the DFR claim as a eans to limit discrimination against
protected classes, at least when the union's decision is based on
an invidious factor. Instead, the good faith duty stands as a bas
to the union's ability to
6. Title Vbd protec
representation
were linsufficient to ensure tha
union did not discriminate
VII provides overlapping
against any of its members,
protection to employees against union discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ~rigin.~%ile the
union is still occasionally a defendant in a Title VIP action
68. See Freed e t al., supra note 39, a t 466.
69. See id.
70. In that sense, critics' complaints about the DFR sound very similar to critics'
emplaints about the business judgment rule in corporate law. The business judgment
rule i a a specific application of a directorial standard of conduct to the situation where
a businem decision is made by disinterested and independent directors on a n informed
basis with a good faith belief that the decision will benefit the corporation. Should the
rsharelrolders sue the directors on the basis that their decision was illegitimate, the
court examines the decision only to the extent necessary to verify the presence of a
business decision, disinterestedness and independence, due care, good faith and the
absence of an abuse of discretion. If these elements are present-and
they are
presumed to be-the court will not second guess the merits of the decision. See
gemrally DENNIS
J. BLOCK m AL., 'I'm BUSJUDGMENT R w : FIDUCIARY
DUTIESOF
CORPObi?% DIRECTORS(4th ed. 1993).
71. See. e.g. Steele v. bouisville & Nashville R.R.. 323 US. 192 (1944) (holdinst

instituted by an employee,7*more often the union's role bas been
as an active player in the e f f ~ r t to eliminate unlawful
employment discrimination in the workplace, any labor unions
have advocated vociferously for the elimination of sexual
di~crimination,~~
disability discrimination and fetal protection
policies.76
When the union has discriminated, courts do not hesitate t o
impose liability under Title VLL77 Courts also empha
Title VII not only imposes a duty on unions to avo
discrimination, but also to eliminate existing
practice^.'^
not to suggest that unions have resolved the dilemma
ing to majority needs while still protecting minorities
or that unions are never guilty of racial discrimination. Yet it
would seem that in light of the severe penalties that can be
imposed for discriminatory behavior, unions would have little
incentive to negotiate a n agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
if such an agreement could be considered discriminatory. As
Samuel Estreicher noted, under current law, an employee
claiming inadequate union representation may disregard the
collective bargaining agreement's finality provisions and go
directly to court.79 Consequently, the union will be forced t o
defend its decision to negotiate a clause or process a grievance in
74. See Goorlman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Daniels v. Pipefitters
Ass'n Local Union, 945 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1991); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers Int'Z
Union, 778 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D.Ohio 1991).
75. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 609 F.
Supp. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
76. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
77. For example, in Gaodrnan v. Ldens Steel Company, 482 US. 656 (19871, the
Court held a union liable under Title Vil for its knowing refusal to pursue grievances
of black members who complained of racial discrimination and harassment by the
employer. Similarly, in Daniels u. Pip$ttersJAss'n. Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906
(7th Cir. 1991E, the Court found a-union liable for its back door hiring hall D O ~ ~ C
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the union will

mbem to Select a
for the Ainrtg of Discrinaination Claims

of a union's apeement
s is that the union only
s, such as the right t o
ual rights, such as the
the airing of a Title VII discrimination
urth Circuit stated that the union's
and other rights protected by
exchange the right to a forum
he Fourth Circuit
ation of the union as their
on to bargain all terms and
ent,
including
agreements to arbitrate
conditions of em
employee's statutory claims. Since the employees voluntarily
elect the union, the court reasoned, the agreement to arbitrate
laims is also voluntary and, therefore, enforceable.
ssent, a labor union cannot waive a
cia1 forum for a statutory claim because
that right belongs to the i n d i ~ i d u a lAccording
.~~
to the dissent,
the; power to waive collective rights does not include the power to
waive individual onesS8"The supposition underlying the dissent's
position in Austin and the Court's position in Gardner-Denver is
that a union's agreement with the employer t o arbitrate
laims is invalid because the
individual employees' statuto
is not offered the o
tunity to waive his right to a
other words, only
individual can waive forum
other objection to the enforce
ate its members' statutosy
waive collective

rejected only once outside the securities i n d ~ s t r y . ' ~
Supporters of Gardner-Denver argue that it is the ability of
khe employee to refuse c agreement that makes his waiver
meanindul. Interestin , the choices presented to the
represented employee are remarkably similar to those presented
to the "Cilmes erny>loyee,"Once an employee becomes aware t h a t
the union and the employer have apeed to arbitrate employees'
statutory claims, the emplayee has the following options: abide
by the union's a eernenf; or look for another job. This is the
identical dilemma unrepresented employees face. Yet the basis

85. Martin Matin identifies this issue as the single most important reason why
Gilmer does not compel reeminatjion of Oardner-Denver. According ta Malin, however
meaningless a 'Gilmer employee's" waiver is, the opportunity to reject the waiver
provides the "Qlmer employee'" the ability to "negotiatle] a separate deal with [his]
employer which did not requirt? arbitration." Malin, supra note 15. By contrast, a
'&~drur-Denuer"employee has no such "choice". Unionized employees do not have the
ability to negotiate separate deals with employers. See id.
86. There is always the possibility, however miniscule, that the employee could
negotiate with the employer to eliminate the clause. In reality, these clauses are
presented on n take-it-or-leave-it basis, Even highly skilled employees are unable to
negotiate the elimination of these clauses. This controversial policy is currently being
reexamined by the NMQ, See Patrick Mchehan, Big Panel is Formed by NALSD,
WALL ST.J., May 29, 1991, at C-1. Possible recommendations include leaving the
arbitration mquirement alone or making it optional. See id. at (2-3.
87. See Prudential Ins. Co, of America v. Lai, 42 F-3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to e n f o m agreement to arbitra& statutory claims because the employees did
not; "knowin&" agree to arbitrate).

es: to csntiirkue

r attempts to draw

using the nievance arbitr

derogating its minority members' interests in favor of majority
us.tlfication for ignori
e parties' wish to
resolve statuto
putes in arbitration.
the represented
have the option to
an arbitration
ove troublesome since all employees are
e: take the agreement or leave the job.
Since the bases for Gard
nver have eroded over time, it
en shown above, none of the
should be overruled. As
reasons Gilmer cited in opposition to the use of predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory rights are valid concerns in
the union setting.

6. Arbitrators Are Authorized to Utilize External Law When
Interpreting the Collectiue Bargaining Agreement if the Parties
In Gurdner-Denver, the Court emphasized that when an
employee submits his grievance to a'rbitration, he seeks to
vindicate his contractual rights, not his statutory rights.ss
According to the Court, statutory rights are independent of the
contract, and must be adjudicated separately even if they arise

R
from the same
while the Gar
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crucial ts note that

expressly require statutov claims to be arbitrated. As a result,

increasingly common to see parties ageeing to arbihate
statutory disp~tes.~'
In these agreements, the parties agree t h a t
the arbitrator will apply ""eternal law9'-the same law a court
ply were it resolving the dispute, As a result,
me more comiFort;able interpreting and
other antidiscrimination statutes." Thus,
it is no longer true that grievance arbitratian is a forum sole
for the resolution af contrac
It is essential for parties who wish to resolve their disputes
using external law to make that inten
r in the language
of the calilective bargaining ageement.
the parties choose
to incorporate external law into their
ent, the arbitrator
is required to interpret and apply that l a ~ . ~ V hwas
i s true eve
in the days of Gardner-Denver, h the absence of a state
inhntion, an arbitrator should reject external law because his
principal task is to interpret and apply the terns of the contrace,
Xf it i s not clear that the parties wish to use external law to

the dispute, the arbitrator wil be prohibited from using
it.

ropriety of using external law to

external law to r
decided to leave t
law should be u
SkeEworkers u.
an arbitrator c
&
, the same time, it e

look to the collective

that an arbitrator must still
g agreement and draw the

94, A broadly drawn provision does not specify whether a n arbitrator should
util~zeexternal law in resolving disputes. A more narrowly drawn clause indicates
whether the arbitrator should use external law. See FWK ELKOURI
& EDNAASPER
EtlcaUM, HOW A R ~ ~ ~ R A T WORKS
I O N 382-83 (4th ed. 1985).
95. Even in cases with broadly drafted arbitration clause, a "significantly greater
number of arbitrators" resolving claims of discrimination "have considered Titie VII
dwtfine in deciding" such cases. See ELKOURI
& ELKOURI,
supra note 94, a t 382. In
interpreting an agreement's prohibition against "discrimination as to age, sex, marital
status, race, color, creed, national origin or political affiliation," id. at 383, Arbitrator
Rournell indicated that where the agreement fails to define discrimination
one must look to the law as it is being developed under applicable statutes
by the courts of the land for a definition. When the parties use a phrase such
as 'discrimination as to . . . creed,' they presumably are incorporating the
applicable law on that subject into their contract. As to the issue of religious
discrimination in employment, the law is set forth in Title VTI.
Id,
96.. 363 U.S.593, 597-98 (1960).
97, Id. a t 597.
98. Id. a t 597-98.

e parties may go eve

basis for disturbing the parties' ageement.'05

1. The Cornpatly and the Union will comply with all laws preventing
discrinkination against Any employee because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, handicap or veteran status.
2. This Contract shall be administered in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the h e d e a n s with Disabilities Act. . . .
3. Any disputes under this Article . . . shall be subject to the grievance
procedure.
Id. at 879-80.
100. k4 Zack RC Blmh emphasize, "[ilf . . . the parties have chosen to incorporate
external law Into t-heir agreement, the arbitrator must interpret and apply that law."
ZACMC Ihoew, ?rupranote 83, at 28-29.
101. 78 F.3d at 875.
102. See idiclr, a t 880-81.
103. In Cole w. Burns hternational Security Seroicas, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir,
19971, the D.C.Circuit suggested that when parties explicitly authorize an arbitrator
to resolve a dispute using a statute, public law is only 'relevant to determining what
contractual rights the parties enjoy." Id, at 1475.According to Cole, adjudication of a
statutory dispute i e an implementation of the contract, not a resolution of the statutory
claim. This view is extremely f a m d l t i c . If a labor arbitrator is requested to resolve
an employee's Title VXK cldm, his interpretation necessarily resolves both the
contradud issue and the statutory one. No purpose is served by permitting relitigation
of the atntutmy claim in a subsequent federal court proceeding. In the absence of any
evidence that arbitrators did not understand the law they were to interpret, it is
senseless to provide the employee with an opportunity to relitigate the same issues.
104. See Alexander v. Gmdner-Denver. 415 U.S. 36. 50 (1974).
ection to a n arbitrator using

evision of

decision to select a particular arbitrator should be respected.
oval of the use of arbitrators to resolve
ims, together vvith the arbitratorsy proven.
such daims, leaves little basis for
experience in decidi
irrvalidating an arbi
on agreement on the basis that the
arbitrator is unqualified to decide these issues. The argument
that arbitrators are qualified t o decide statutory disputes is
pelfing in the employment discrimination context,
where cases most often turn on factual. not legal issue^."^ Thus,
in employment cases, the effect on the underlying dispute of an.
arbitrator's misunderstanding of the statute is minimized. In
addition, judliciali review o f the legal issues is always possible.111

dispute^ and that arbitrators are capable of resolving them despite the parties' limited
access to judicial review following an arbitral decision.
After studying 'thousands" of arbitration opinions, the Elkouris conclude that
arbitrators are not only capable of understanding and applying external law, but that
"this capability probably equals mdl sometimes exceeds that of many courts, including
some federal courts." id.
109. AMERICANk ~ r n ~ t oASS'N,
l u EWWYMENT
D I S P RESOLIPTION
~
RULES 9 &(a)
(19931, available m 1993 WL 592205.
110. See MaXin, supra note 15, at 104 ('Most employment disputes are fact-based
and not likely to raise the kind of legal issues that would call for significant judiciat
review."). A study conducted in the 1980s found that discrimination claims involve
factual issues eighty-four percent of the time. See Noyman & Stallworth, supra note
26, a t 49, 53.
111. The standard for judicial review of grievance arbitration decisions is quite
deferential. See U&ed Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Gorp., 363 U.S. 593,
699 (1960). Yet this deference is not unlimited. According to Enterprise Wheel, "[wlhen
the arbitrator's, words manifest an infidelity to this obligation [to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement], courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of
the award." Id. at 597. While this standard does not provide much opportunity for
review of an arbitrator's decision, in its language and intent it is quite similar to the
FAA's deferential standard for judicial review. The FAA permits reversal of the
arbitrator's award when the arbitrator has shown manifest disregard of the law or has
engaged in some type of egregious misconduct demonstrating fraud, corruption or
partiality. See 9 U.S.C. fi 10(a)(l)-f5) (1994). When the parties have agreed to resolve
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In evaluating the ilmer decision, commentators have found
rbing the Court's emphatic rejection of
the existence of unequal bargaining
es between an
invalid.'12 The Court stated that while vallidilcgr of consent can be
examined on a case-by-case basis, only agreements that are the
result of fraud o venvhelming economic advantage would be
unmfurceable. 'I3
spite the Gilmer Court's forceful statement
on the matter, the question of whether unequal bargaining
wer should invalidate an a eement to arbitrate statutory
ims has remained unsettled.
of continuing impost;ance because of
ner's reversal on the basis th
unceasing calls for
te are unfair to employees.
agreements to ar
'GCElrner agreements" should be rejected is
basis for arguing
ed into voluntarily. Voluntariness in this
hemism for unequal bargaining power.
e agreements are not voluntary because
the employee confronted with the agreement has no ability to
reject it or negotiate its terms.''* The employee's inability to
make a legitimate choice stems from the fact that the agreement

their disputes using external law in the collective bargaining context, the standard of
review of the arbitrator's award would look remarkably similar. The main inquiry
would b e whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable external law.
Gdmer declared that the IiMs system of judicial review was sufficiently protective of
employee's statutory rights. Thus, it would seem logical to hold that the Enterprise
Whel's system of judicial review is equally appropriate for review of statutory disputes
resolved in grievance arbitration.
112. See, e.g., Christine 6. Cooper, Where Are We Ooing With Gilmerf-Some
Rwntnutbm on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST.LOUIS U.PUB.L. REV.
203, 220-21 (1992); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEYJ. EMP.& LAB. L. 131, 153
(1996).
113. See Gilmer v. Znterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.20, 33 (1991) (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryder-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U S . 614, 627 (1985)).
114. See 140 CONG.
REc.54266-03 (1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (attacking
predispute arbitration agreements because they are mandatory, as opposed to
voluntary); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F,3d 1299, 1299 (9th Cir.
1994) (requiring "knowing and voluntary" consent before enforcement of executory
arbitration agreement); Sternlight, supra note 6, at 637. Some commentators reject the
theory that predispute arbitration agreements are not voluntary. According to Professor
Stephea Ware, for instance, such agreements are voluntary because the employee can
always choose not to accept the position. See Ware, w p m note 3.

is prpreseglted on a take-iGor-leave-it basis,

arises: if Gilmer

to a collective bargaining ageem

agreement" and serves to explain why the perceived unfairness
of the "Gilrner a eement" is not present in cases invoking
''Gardner-Denveragreements,"
Arbitration of public law issues in a nonunion setting is
troubling because the structural protections inherent in
collective bargaining are not pre~ent."~
Unlike interactions in
the collective bargaining context, in which both the employer a n
the union are regular participants in miegstiatian and arbitration,
only the employer is a "repeat playcr"ll' in individual
amployment arbitration,
employee, by contrast, is a one-shot
analysis of the interactions between one-shotters
and repeat players demonstrates that repeat players have a

1

r-Employee Negotiations

The repeat player's s e a t e r experience, expertise and
sophistication in contract negotiation will provide it sipificant
shot players. For instance,
advantages in inte
repeat player is likely to
in the dispute resol
ave a much better
Landing of the risks and benefits of
ous dispute
on mechanisms. Through this
mderstanding, the
player may be able to choose the
m that best favors both parties, or
dispute resolution
one that is more favorable to it.'' A one-shot player, by contrast,
will be unable t o waliuate intelligently the proposed clause,
because of a lack of experience in dispute resolution and
inadequate resources to investigate the benefits and drawbacks
of the clause.
The repeat player may also enjoy significant benefits during
the dispute resolution process. A greater understanding of the
process and an ability to influence that process through repeated
er provides the repeat
informal relations with the de
&yes notable advantages.
, the repeat player's
institutional memory will lead to more informed choices in
selecting an a r b i t r a t ~ r , "The
~ one-shot player will not have a
similar ability to influence the arbitrator and cannot afford to
keep track of different arbitrators' decisions.
Finally, the repeat player may benefit from the fact that oneshot players, such as employees, tend t o value improperly the

tat bias as a result of

of the arbitration ta~eementbecause of their greater experience
and superior knowledge, as well as in the selection of the
arbitrator m d in the
I. Arbitration agreement negotiation

f repeat playera use contracts in their negotiations with oneplnycsrs, they will attempt to maximize profits and benefits
ies of scale by using standardized
rtunity for negotiation of terms.
with a standardized
ement, a one-shot player can only
attempt to gain conce
s on the negotiable terms if he fully
or costs arising from the
appreciates the dis
nonnegotiable porkion
ement. To appreciate the value
ployee would need to read and
oposed ageementaa3 Yet the rational
employee will not invest substantial resources in reading or
analyzing a proposed agreement. Such behavior is rational
because the expected benefits from undertaking such an

122. Judgmental bias causes people to misassess the likelihood that a law

investigaGon wou
associated with s
be reduced even

ntrast, a rational repeat player will have included the

employment agreement in a way that furnishes it the most
advantage.126 Moreover, the rational employer's position is
further enhanced by its ability to present the arbitration

124. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN.
L. REV. 211,241-43(1995). Eisenberg explains that rational form readers will
remain ignorant of the terms because the cost of evaluating them is a waste of
resources and the likelihood of the clause's relevance is low. See id, Perhaps more
impohntty, workers simply have other things on their minds. As one author put it,
"Lpeoplewant to eat first and consider legal and philosophical implications later.'"
Jeffrey W, Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387
(1991)(quoting 2 Brecht, Dreigroschenoper [The T h e e Penny Opera], in GESAMMELTE
WERKE: SWKE Kollected Works1 457 (1967)).
'd Charny, Nonlegal
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agreement on a
understands the

X

the arbitration proceedings. The bias resu
precedent system for tracking arbitration decisions,
2. knteruction with the arbitrator

An individual us
arbitration to resolve disputes has the
incentive to compile
rmation about potential arbitrators and
onship with those
sions and develop a
ictability of arbitral
former will allow bette
the individual to
outcomes. The latter will potentiaUy
influence the ouakome of the arbitratio
employer's position
as a repeat player enables it to accomplish both of these goals.
It makes economic sense for the repeat player to monitor
arbitrators' decisions and acquire advance intelligence about
each arbitrator because it is likely that it will use that
information repeatedly in the future. Not sumrisingly, it i s
common for large or
izations and law firms that represent
those organizations
keep databases containin
background information an each potential arbitrabr, including
how the arbitrator ruled in a number of cases, as well as the
quality of his decision,128
For the same reason, the repeat player will take the.
opportunity to develop kcilitative informal relations with the
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127. See Cole v. Burns Int? Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C.Cir. 1997); Lewis
Maltby, Paradise hsF: How the Gilmer Court &st the opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Re.wtutian to Improue Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.J. Hm.RTS, 1, 4-5 (1994).
128. One large, management-side, labor law firm in Chicago maintains a database
that utndicat& whether an arbitrator found in favor of management or union, describes
the issue in dispute and offem the participating attorney's opinion regarding the quality
of the decision. Other resources containing infomation about arbitrators exist. The
Labor Arbltrat;ion Information Senrice (LAIS) provides information regarding an
arbitrator's past decisions, including the percentage of times the arbitrator has found
ia. favor of management and the union. The LAIS also indicates the arbltratds
percentages in discipline and nondiscipline cases and then considers the arbitrator's
decisions individually, providing a summary of the subjects a t issue in the arbitration.
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he structure of the current arbitrator selection system does
ployeek disadvantages, Quite to
nate the one-shot
provides significant benefits to
e of the employee,
the employer, at the e
d in favor of the
likely to, feel pressure
ecause industry members will more
arbitrator. In addition, in many
employer pays the arbitrator's
e employer "owns" the process as
itrator's ultimate resolution of the
4
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129. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Lirnzts of &gal Chance, 9 LAW& SOC'Y REV.95, 110-12 (1974).
130. Although potential pldntiEs would be acting irrationally if they attempted to
obtain similar Information, the question is why a business or Iaw firm has failed to
develop similar databases for plaintiffs' use. The response is simply that it would be
ocoarrmieally ineEcient to expend the kind of resources necessary Q obtain such
mfomation unless there was some assurance that plaintiffs would choose to pay the
collector of the information for use of that Information. In other words, a s long a s a
business or law firm would have no assurance that they would receive a return on
their investment, it would be irrational for them to compile such a resource. Employers
and their law firms, on the,other hand, do have a n incentive to compile such
hfomation because a large employer will typically hire one law firm to handle all of
its employment lawsuits.
Similarly, there is little incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to collect and maintain a
database containing information about arbitrators. While such information would make
a plaintiff's lawyer more marketable and would allow him to increase his fees if the
infarmation made her more successful, an investment in that infomation might not be
fruitful because employees are one-shot players in the legal hiring world just a s they
are in the dispute resolution world.
131. See Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace
Dispute Resolver, 49 DISP. RESOL.
J. 48, 50 (1994)"In a recent case, the 13.6. Circuit
held that i t is preferable to have employers pay for the entire process. See Cole, 105
F,3d 1465. The Cole court suggested that Gilmer might not have approved a program
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the "absence of an agreement to pay
mbitratars' fees." Id. a t 1484. Moreover, the Cole court rejected the theory that a
repeat player has the ability, if it pays for the process, to control it. The Cote court
stated, "[ilt is doubtful that arbitrators care about who pays them, so long a s they are
paid for their services." Id.

be sure that the
rehire her in $he future.
Thus, the employer main

1

th the Repeat Player:

As the D.C. Circuit recently acknowledged, arbitration in the
collective
context is not as troubling as arbitration
between
and inclividuall employees because the
structure of the negotiation and arbitral process does not confer
benefits on one party a t the expense of the other.'" I n unionmanagement re ations, both parties are frequent participants, or
"repeat players" in negotiation and arbitration.

9

e arbitration agreement
3

The dynamics of the relationship between two repeat players
temper many of the defects present in the relationship between
132. Unrepresented employees suffer from an additional disadvantage: judgmental
bias. Judgmental bias causes individuals to misperceive the likelihood that an event
that rarely occw
md that they have never experienced will occur again in the future.
See Slovic et al., supm no& 122, a t 468. 'Phis bias, together with most people's belief
that they are immune from hazards, results in an inability to perceive accurately t h e
likelihood that a low probabiiitv event will occur. See id.

i

i

Xn repeat ~jlayer
lar experience and
ion. Economies of

to apportion fairly the agreement's surplus.
The drafting party creates the agree ent with the
negotiator will review it. As a
first draft is aware that drafting
agreement may result in the kin
teXy trigger the relationship's demise.
Ftlrther, even
elf-serving behavior went undetected
initially, the self-seming party would have difficulty dealing with
out the life of the agreement and would
the other party 9;
certainly face tou
in subsequent negotiations. 'rhus,
in drafting an agreemen
another repeat player, the drafter
has the proper incentives both to draft an eEcient contract, and
to distribute equitably the economic benefits.
In game theory terms, the strategy that motivates a repeat
player engaged in continued interactions with other repeat
players to avoid overreaching is the game of "tit for tat.'"% Using
the "tit for tat" strategy, a party's optimal strategy is to
cooperating and continue to cooperate as long as one's
does, If one's opponent engages in an act of betrayal, the affected
party should retaliate. This strategy discourages noncooperative
behavior while permitting a pattern of mutual cooperation to
develop. Thus, "tit for tat" is the best strategy in a repeat-move
game involving repeat p 1 a ~ e r s . l ~ ~
Applying this theory to the union-management relationship
yields predictable results. First, the union is a repository of
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of the ageement or during the next round of negotiations.

1

P

'korrect" resolution of the dispute. In most repeat player
s the preferred method of dispute resolution is
arbitration.
2. Dispute resolution between repeat players

player.13' According tcr

3

ecause parties can eusto
interests, mbitration also has
acceptable result at a low cost.
wealth transfers
resources rather

equalized over the long run and that erroneous awards can be
dealt with through negotiation, all have contributed to the
common labor-relations practi of routinely obeying awards,
even those that the losing s
considers e r r o n e ~ u s . " ~The
~l
method for dealing with awards that are perceived to be unfair
to the union or the employer is not reprisal or disobedience, both
of which might cause negotiation difficulties in the future, but
rather simply the decision not to hire the offending arbitrator
again in the future.

dispute resolation and will
constituents, the employees.

n i s in a much better

are contractual or statutory.

CONCLUSION
Predispute arbitration ageements betweon employers and
employees are unquestionably enforceable following Gilrner u,
nson Lane Corporation,
Court has been reluctant to enforce si
unionized workplace, citing Alexander u. Gardner-Denver, for the
proposition that such agreements are not enforceable.
Over the past twenty years, however, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have articulated an increasingly favorable
attitude toward the use of arbitration to resolve statutory
disputes. Tho Court has also repeatedly announced that the
arbitral forum is a perfectly adequate venue for the resolution of
statutory rights, This new vision of arbitration, when considered
in conjunction with the erosion of Cfardner-Denver's foundation,
mandates a re-evaluation and reversal of Gardner-Denver. A
number of lower courts have already begun the movement,
placing collectively-bargained agreements to resolve statutory
disputes using external antidiscrimination laws on equal footing
with "Gilrner agreements." While some differences between the
eemcsnts remain, these are distinctions without a
difference that should be acknowledged as such and rejected.
Furthermore, even if Cilnzer were ultimately overruled or
unfair, Gardner-

